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Examining Product Risk in Context
Market Withdrawal of Zomepirac as a Case Study
Dennis Ross-Degnan, ScD; Stephen B. Soumerai, ScD; Eric E. Fortess, ScD, MPH; Jerry H. Gurwitz, MD
Objective.\p=m-\Toexamine changes in the prescribing of analgesics after the mar-
ket entry and subsequent withdrawal of zomepirac sodium, a nonsteroidal anti\x=req-\
inflammatory drug (NSAID), following repeated reports of zomepirac-related deaths.
Design.\p=m-\Toevaluate this natural quasi experiment, we conducted time-series
analyses to compare prescribing in two cohorts of primary care physicians from July
1980 through September 1983.
Setting.\p=m-\Studyphysicians provided outpatient pharmaceutical care to patients
enrolled in the New Jersey Medicaid program.
Participants.\p=m-\Weidentified 260 primary care physicians who provided 10 or
more prescriptions for zomepirac (zomepirac prescribers) and 308 who provided
10 or more prescriptions for NSAIDs other than zomepirac (other-NSAID prescrib-
ers) in Medicaid during the study period.
Main Outcome Measures.\p=m-\Monthlyrates of prescribing for zomepirac and
several categories of substitute analgesics among Medicaid patients seen by study
physicians.
Main Results.\p=m-\Zomepiracaccounted for a stable 11.0% of analgesic prescrib-
ing among the zomepirac-prescriber cohort; label changes and manufacturer
product-risk warnings 11 months before the product's withdrawal from the market
had no impact on use. After market entry, zomepirac prescribers reduced use of
other NSAIDs and propoxyphene (hydrochloride or napsylate) in comparison with
other-NSAID prescribers (-8.1% and -2.8% of total analgesic prescribing,
respectively; P<.001). After the product's withdrawal from the market, zomepirac
prescribers showed significant increases in relative prescribing of other NSAIDs(+6.8%; P<.001), propoxyphene (+2.1%; P<.05), and analgesics containing bar-
biturates (+2.7%; P<.001).
Conclusions.\p=m-\Thesudden withdrawal of zomepirac from the market resulted
in substitutions not only of other NSAIDs, but also of alternative analgesics that carry
risks of habituation and adverse effects. Apparent gains in patient safety resulting
from market withdrawal of medications must be evaluated in comparison with risks
of medications likely to be substituted.
(JAMA. 1993;270:1937-1942)
DURING the past two decades, an in¬
creasing number of government, medi¬
cal, and lay press reports have focused
on the problem ofunanticipated adverse
reactions to prescription drugs.1 Gov¬
ernment and industry responses have
ranged from modest label warnings2 to
withdrawal of the offending product from
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the market, as in the recent case of tria-
zolam in the United Kingdom.3 One ra¬
tionale for product removal is an un¬
stated assumption by regulators and
policymakers that all clinical risks at¬
tributable to a drug are eliminated when
it is withdrawn; rarely do they examine
the comparative risks and benefits of
alternative medications that may be sub¬
stituted for the withdrawn product.4 We
are not aware of any controlled studies
that have examined this question. This
investigation analyzes changes in the
use ofvarious alternative analgesics fol¬
lowing the market entry and withdrawal
of zomepirac sodium.
Zomepirac is a prostaglandin syn-
thetase inhibitor, one of a class of anal¬
gesic products referred to collectively
as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs(NSAIDs). The drug was first marketed
in the United States by McNeil Phar¬
maceutical, Spring House, Pa, in No¬
vember 1980, under the proprietary
name Zomax.5 Indications for which it
was marketed included relief of moder¬
ate to severe postoperative pain, as well
as acute and chronic orthopedic condi¬
tions, osteoarthritis, muscle-contraction
headache, dysmenorrhea, and the
chronic pain of cancer.6 Zomepirac
achieved rapid acceptance, accounting
for 11% of new analgesic prescriptions
within 4 months of its introduction.7,8
For editorial comment see
 
1976.
The first report of an apparent ana-
phylactic reaction to zomepirac was pub¬
lished in April 1981, about 5 months after
the product was released.9 In July 1981,
McNeil included a mild warning in all
product labeling stating that "reactions
have been reported."1" After further case
reports ofzomepirac-associated anaphy-
laxis appeared in the medical litera¬
ture,11·12 the manufacturer sent warning
letters in April 1982 to 200000 physi¬
cians, alerting them to the drug's poten¬
tial for serious allergic reactions. How¬
ever, 1 week later, the company launched
a major 10-week sales campaign ("Op¬
eration 111") intended to increase sales
ofzomepirac and tolmetin, two of its most
successful analgesics. On March 3, 1983,
a Syracuse, NY, television report cited
five zomepirac-associated deaths, includ¬
ing a dramatic account by a physician
who suffered a life-threatening anaphy-
lactic reaction.13 The following day, Mc¬
Neilvoluntarily recalled the product from
the market.14 Following 2 years of law¬
suits and hearings by both the Food and
Drug Administration and Congress, Mc¬
Neil permanently withdrew zomepirac
in May 1985.16
Zomepirac's rapid capture of a sizable
share of the analgesic market, followed
by stable use for an extended period be¬
fore sudden withdrawal, provides an op¬
portunity to assess both expected and
unanticipated substitution effects caused
by market availability of a popular drug.
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Table 1.—Prescriptions for Study Analgesics per 100 Medicaid Recipients in Practice by Provider Specialty, July 1980 Through November 1981
Physician Group
Study Analgesics
Physicians,
No.
Zomepirac
Sodium
Other
NSAIDs*
Analgesic
With Opioidst
Analgesic
With Barbiturates
All Study
Analgesics
General practice 5.1 39.2 34,4 8.8 87.5
Internal medicine 73.7 12.9 147.4
Family practice 238 3.7 45.3 33.0 8.2 90.2
All Primary Care Physicians 1183 4.9 49.0 100.7
Dentistry, oral surgery 140 3.3 4.9 81.8 94.2
Pediatrics 121 0.2 2.7 4.9 0.7 8.5
General surgery 36.1 33.3 80.9
Obstetrics, gynecology 106 1.3 9.8 21.7 5.7 38.5
Other specialty 287 3.1 29.8 42.8 7.0 82.7
All Non-Primary Care Physicians 776 1.5 13.1 4.0
*NSAID indicates nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug.
tAnalgesIc products containing propoxyphene (hydrochloride or napsylate), pentazocine, meperidine hydrochloride, or codeine.
Few studies have examined drug sub¬
stitution in a critical way,16 and even fewer
have studied the comparative risks as¬
sociated with substituted agents.17 Herein
we analyze shifts in analgesic prescrib¬
ing patterns associated with zomepirac's
market entry; changes in product use
during its market life span, particularly
at the time of warnings about its safety;
and the impact of its rapid withdrawal.
We conclude with a discussion ofthe need
to evaluate drugs in relation to their likely
substitutes and implications for health
policy decision making.
METHODS
Study Analgesics
We identified all drugs that were po¬
tential analgesic alternatives to zomepi¬
rac at the time of the study, as deter¬
mined by an expert panel of physicians
and clinical pharmacists familiar with re¬
search on Medicaid pharmaceutical prac¬
tices. To be included in the study, a medi¬
cation had to be marketed for the treat¬
ment of mild to moderate pain and be
available by prescription only. The panel
used contemporary drug compendia18·19
as references to aid in selecting alterna¬
tive product classes and identifying all
marketed products chemically equivalent
to the generic entities contained in each
class. The identified drugs were grouped
into five categories: (1) zomepirac; (2)
other NSAIDs; (3) analgesics containing
propoxyphene (hydrochloride or napsy-
late); (4) analgesics containing another
opioid (codeine, hydromorphone hydro-
chloride, meperidinehydrochloride, mor¬
phine sulfate, oxycodone, or pentazocine);
and (5) analgesics containing barbiturates(combinations with butalbital). The
"other-NSAID" category included all
NSAIDs other than zomepirac that were
available prior to 1984: benoxaprofen,
diflunisal, fenoprofen, ibuprofen, in-
domethacin, meclofenamate sodium,
mefanamic acid, naproxen, oxyphenbuta-
zone, phenylbutazone, piroxicam, sulin-
dac, and tolmetin. We did not include
over-the-counter products such as ac¬
etaminophen or salicylates since we
lacked complete data on their use.
The study drugs selected by the ex¬
pert panel vary greatly in safety and
efficacy. For example, zomepirac has
been estimated to have 500 to 1000 times
the risk of producing a severe anaphy-
lactic reaction as other NSAIDs.15 The
opioid analgesics can be habituating, and
have also been associated with the oc¬
currence of other adverse effects, in¬
cluding hip fracture.20 Propoxyphene
may be no more effective an analgesic
than aspirin, and its use has been asso¬
ciated with a substantial number of over¬
dose deaths.21 Other opioid analgesics
such as meperidine can pose a risk of
neuropsychiatrie toxic effects.22·23 Fi¬
nally, analgesics that contain long-act¬
ing barbiturates carry potential safety
risks in dosing and liability for abuse.24
Data Sources
Drug claims data from the New Jer¬
sey Medicaid Management Information
System provided information on pre¬
scriptions filled and reimbursed during
the 39-month study period (July 1980
through September 1983). All claims for
the study analgesics were extracted from
a previously selected 40% random
sample of patients in the New Jersey
Medicaid program who received at least
one prescription for any drug during
this period, a total of 173 726 individu¬
als. The drug claims data used included
recipient identifier, drug product code,
date the prescription was filled, and a
prescriber identification number.
We used these drug claims data to
identify all physicians who prescribed
one or more analgesic prescriptions to a
member of this sample of New Jersey
Medicaid drug recipients. Thus, physi¬
cians were not chosen randomly, but
were selected by virtue of their pre¬
scribing to a random sample of drug
recipients. We also obtained a complete
Medicaid provider file, which included
the stated specialties of all physicians
participating in the New Jersey Med¬
icaid program during the study period.
Using prescriber and recipient identi¬
fying numbers, we calculated for every
provider the total number of undupli-
cated Medicaid recipients in our patient
sample for whom a medication of any
type was prescribed, which was used as
a proxy for Medicaid practice size.
Selection of Physician Study Group
To describe changes in prescribing an¬
algesics in a stable population of pri¬
mary care providers, we first identified
1964 physicians, dentists, and osteopaths
with at least one filled prescription for
any study analgesic in every 6-month
period throughout the study. This group,
which was responsible for the majority
of all analgesic prescriptions to our
sample of New Jersey Medicaid recipi¬
ents, averaged over 7600 analgesic pre¬
scriptions per month, or 4.4 analgesic
prescriptions per 100 patients. Control¬
ling for changes in prescribing due to
the entry and withdrawal of zomepirac
from the market, analgesic prescribing
remained approximately constant dur¬
ing the follow-up period.
Since we were primarily interested in
the prescribing of zomepirac in general
ambulatory practice, we used the medi¬
cal specialty data to identify 1183 pri¬
mary care physicians, defined as gen¬
eral practitioners, family practitioners,
and internists. These physicians repre¬
sented 60% of consistent prescribers,
and wrote a total of 475 600 reimbursed
analgesic prescriptions (80.2% of the to¬
tal) to 96989 Medicaid patients (55.8%
of total recipients of any drug) during
the 39-month study. As indicated in
Table 1, these primary care physicians
were more likely than other providers
to prescribe NSAIDs in general (53.9
prescriptions per 100 patients during
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this period vs 14.6 prescriptions per 100
patients from other physicians) and
zomepirac in particular (4.9 vs 1.5 pre¬
scriptions per 100 patients, respectively).
To examine product substitution ef¬
fects in primary care, we identified 260
physicians who provided 10 ormore zome¬
pirac prescriptions during the 28-month
period of product life from November
1980 through February 1983 (called
zomepirac prescribers). Because other
secular trends in drug utilization could
conceivably have resulted in increased
prescribing of some substitute drugs
independent of the withdrawal of zome¬
pirac, we constructed a comparison group
of 308 primary care physicians who did
not prescribe zomepirac, but who pro¬
vided 10 or more prescriptions for other
NSAIDs during the study period (called
other-NSAID prescribers).
Data Analyses
We first constructed time series of an¬
algesic utilization by computing the
monthly number of analgesic prescrip¬
tions overall and within each analgesic
category. All months were adjusted to
contain the equivalent of 30 days. We
then divided monthly utilization by the
number of unduplicated Medicaid drug
recipients in the practices of physicians
in each group (as described above), ex¬
pressing the results as utilization per 100
recipients. The resulting time-series data
for total analgesic use were analyzed by
specifying a segmented linear regression
model with correction for serially auto-
correlated observations.2629 This model
estimated the overall level and trend in
analgesic prescribing during the study
period, as well as the size and signifi¬
cance of any changes in level of prescrib¬
ing (discontinuities) after zomepirac en¬
tered the market, and immediately fol¬
lowing its withdrawal from the market.
In this and in all other time-series mod¬
els, data from November through De¬
cember 1980 and March through April
1981, the periods of immediate market
adjustment following zomepirac's release
and withdrawal, respectively, were ex¬
cluded to obtain more precise estimates.
For zomepirac, the time-series model
applied only to the 28-month period it
was on the market. We added a term to
the model to estimate changes in zome¬
pirac prescribing following the April 1982
nationwide warnings to physicians con¬
cerning adverse drug reactions.
Substitution effects were estimated
by contrasting the time series for zome¬
pirac prescribers vs other-NSAID pre¬
scribers in each of the five analgesic
categories. We converted each drug cat¬
egory's monthly utilization data in each
category to its proportion of total anal¬
gesic prescriptions (ie, the proportional
preference or market share of each cat¬
egory). This method provided both a
stable measure of physician choice of
analgesic, the behavior of interest, and
controlled for any difference in rates of
baseline analgesic prescribing between
the two study groups. The resulting
monthly time-series data were analyzed
using segmented linear regression mod¬
els. These models estimated, for the two
prescriber cohorts, the underlying level
and trend in proportional use of each
analgesic category, and any discontinui¬
ties in use when zomepirac entered the
market and when it was withdrawn. The
same model also included terms to
estimate any differences between zome¬
pirac prescribers and other-NSAID
prescribers in changes in analgesic pref¬
erence when zomepirac entered the
market and when it was withdrawn.29
RESULTS
Zomepirac prescribers averaged 6.2 an¬
algesic prescriptions per 100 recipients
per month (95% confidence interval [CI],
5.9 to 6.6), compared with a slightly lower
5.5 analgesic prescriptions per 100 re¬
cipients (95% CI, 5.2 to 5.7) among other-
NSAID prescribers. There was no ob¬
servable trend in total analgesic use in
either group during the study period.
However, during the period zomepirac
was on the market, total analgesic use
rose among zomepirac prescribers by an
estimated 0.5 prescriptions per month,
although this rise was not significant (95%
CI, -0.0 to 1.0).
The rapid acceptance and stability of
zomepirac prescribing over time among
the study cohort of zomepirac prescrib¬
ers paralleled the patterns observed in
the entire population of Medicaid phy¬
sicians prescribing analgesics. After a
rapid rise in prescribing during the first
2 months of its availability, zomepirac
accounted for 11.0% of total analgesics
prescribed in this group (95% CI, 10.4%
to 11.6%; Fig 1, bottom). There was no
discernible reduction in zomepirac pre¬
scribing by these primary care physi¬
cians associated with the April 1982
warning letter issued by McNeil con¬
cerning the potential for severe allergic
reactions.
Other NSAIDs accounted for slightly
less than half of all analgesic prescrip¬
tions in both primary care prescriber
cohorts before zomepirac was released(Fig 1, top). The use of other NSAIDs
rose significantly in both cohorts
throughout the study period. However,
once zomepirac became available, the
trends in use diverged, with the rate of
prescribing other NSAIDs increasing
more slowly among zomepirac prescrib¬
ers than among other-NSAID prescrib¬
ers. After zomepirac was withdrawn
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Fig 1.—Time-series analyses of prescribing zome¬
pirac sodium (bottom), other nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) (top), and pro-
poxyphene (hydrochloride or napsylate) (middle)
among primary care physicians prescribing zome¬
pirac (n=260) vs those prescribing NSAIDs other
than zomepirac (n=308).
from the market, prescribing of other
NSAIDs rose rapidly among former
zomepirac prescribers to the rate ob¬
served in the comparison cohort.
We also compared monthly rates of
prescribing of the other study analge¬
sics between zomepirac prescribers and
other NSAID prescribers. The presence
of zomepirac on the market was asso¬
ciated with a clear divergence of trends
between the two groups in the use of
single-agent and combination pro¬
poxyphene products (Fig 1, middle).
Prior to the release ofzomepirac, future
prescribers of zomepirac showed a
slightly higher rate of prescribing pro¬
poxyphene than the comparison group.
After zomepirac entered the market, the
relative rates of propoxyphene use in
these two groups reversed, with other-
NSAID prescribers having a slightly but
consistently higher preference for pro¬
poxyphene than zomepirac prescribers.
When zomepirac was withdrawn, the
rates ofprescribing propoxyphene in the
two groups became very similar.
The results of segmented linear re¬
gression models of analgesic preference
are presented in Table 2. As shown in
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Table 2.—Changes in Analgesic Preference Following Release of Zomepirac and Its Market Withdrawal Among Prescribers of Zomepirac and Prescribers
of Other NSAIDs*
Study Analgesic Category, Proportional Share of Use (SE)t
Zomepirac
Sodium
Other
NSAIDs Propoxyphene}
Other
Opioids Barbiturates
Use at beginning of study period (June 1980) 0.000 0.475(0.0061) 0.210(0.0042) 0.206 (0.0040) 0.109(0.003)
Monthly trend in use (July 1980-September 1983) <0.001§ 0.002II (0.0003) <0.001 -0.0 2  (0.0002) <0.001
Changes in average monthly use among
prescribers of other NSAIDs
While zomepirac on market <0.001 0.059II (0.0087) -0.027||(0.0061) -0.01311(0.0058) -0.01811(0.0045)
Following withdrawal <0.001 -0.02311(0.0010) 0.008 (0.0069) 0.033II (0.0066) -0.018# (0.0051)
Difference between prescribers of zomepirac
and prescribers of other NSAIDs
While zomepirac on market 0.110||(0.001) -0.081||(0.0047) -0.02811 (0.0033) -0.002(0.0031) 0.001 (0.0024)
Following withdrawal -0.110||(0.003) 0.06811(0.0118) 0.02111(0.0082) -0.005 (0.0078) 0.02711(0.0061)
*NSAID indicates nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug.
fBased on time-series regression models.
^Propoxyphene hydrochloride or propoxyphene napsylate.§SEs not reported for proportions <0.001.
l|P<.ooi.
HP<.05.
#P<.01.
Fig 2, during the period zomepirac was
on the market (November 1980 through
February 1983), the total preference for
NSAIDs grew significantly in both
groups of prescribers. However, among
our cohort of zomepirac prescribers, we
estimate that NSAID use (including
zomepirac) was 2.9% higher than among
other-NSAID prescribers (95% CI, 1.9%
to 3.9%; P<.001). This difference in pref¬
erence was balanced by a lower use of
propoxyphene analgesics (-2.8%; 95%
CI, -2.2% to -3.4%; P<.001) among
zomepirac prescribers. The use of other
opioid analgesics and barbiturates de¬
clined significantly in both groups.
After zomepirac was withdrawn from
the market, over two thirds of the 11.0%
of analgesic prescribing previously al¬
located to zomepirac was offset by a
relative increase in the use of other
NSAIDs (+6.8%; 95% CI, 4.4% to 9.2%;
P<.001). Despite this increase, total
NSAID use among zomepirac prescrib¬
ers remained about 1.4% lower than in
the comparison group. Relative increases
in two other analgesic categories offset
the remaining reductions in zomepirac
prescribing. Preference for pro¬
poxyphene was 2.1% higher among
former zomepirac users (95% CI, 0.4%
to 3.8%; P<.05), and relative use of bar¬
biturates was 2.7% higher (95% CI, 1.5%
to 3.9%; P<.001). The use ofother opioid
analgesics rose significantly in both
groups during this period.
COMMENT
Zomepirac and the Analgesic Market
We are not aware ofany well-designed
studies that have investigated the in¬
tended and unintended impacts of with¬
drawal of a drug by its manufacturer
due to unexpected and serious adverse
drug reactions.30 Zomepirac was an in¬
teresting product to study because it
captured a substantial share of the an-
algesic market very soon after it was
introduced, and maintained this level
consistently throughout its market life.
In our large Medicaid claims database,
zomepirac accounted for 12.4% of
NSAID use while it was on the market,
and 6.4% of total analgesic prescribing,
findings that are reasonably consistent
with national figures.31"33
Zomepirac's rapid acceptance and
large market share suggest an effective
marketing effort by McNeil. Nationally
disseminated mailed warnings to pre¬
scribers in April 1982 concerning zome¬
pirac's potential to cause anaphylactic
reactions had no detectable effect on
zomepirac use in our cohort of260 zome¬
pirac prescribers, or in the larger cohort
of 1964 physicians. One explanation for
the warning's apparent lack of impact
was the launch of a major promotional
campaign targeting zomepirac prescrib¬
ers 1 week after the mailed letter. It is
possible that the apparent overall lack
ofeffect ofproduct warnings, rather than
reflecting a stable market, may mask a
situation in which some physicians re¬
duced prescribing due to concerns about
the product, while others increased pre¬
scribing in response to intensified mar¬
keting efforts.
Regardless of the promotional cam¬
paign's effectiveness, mailed warnings
about pharmaceutical products have
been shown to be very weak behavior-
change interventions in comparison with
more direct, person-to-person methods.1
We previously reported a similar lack of
effect of repeated warnings by the US
Food and Drug Administration and phar¬
maceutical manufacturers aimed at re¬
ducing misuse of propoxyphene analge¬
sics due to their risk of toxic effects and
habituation.21
There is ample evidence that zomepi¬
rac's entry into and exit from the mar¬
ketplace was accompanied by significant
shifts in choice of analgesic therapies.
Primary care physicians were the pre¬
dominant prescribers ofzomepirac. When
zomepirac became available, it appears
to have been adopted by some primary
care physicians not only as a preferred
NSAID, but also as an apparently safer,
more rational alternative to analgesics
such as propoxyphene for treating gen¬
eral acute or chronic pain.31 When zome¬
pirac was withdrawn, the majority of its
use was replaced by other NSAIDs, an
apparent gain in product safety. How¬
ever, significant increases in preference
for propoxyphene and fixed-combination
barbiturate analgesics were also seen.
These substituted products themselves
carry notable risks ofadverse clinical con¬
sequences, including habituation and ac¬
cidental death.
Limitations of Study Methods
Several limitations ofour methods and
threats to the validity of our findings
must be considered. The generalizabil-
ity of our results may be limited by a
number of factors. Our sample selection
process eliminated any physician who
did not prescribe at least one analgesic
to a member of our random sample of
patients. We also observed only the Med¬
icaid portion of each study physician's
practice, and we further required that
physicians have some analgesic prescrib¬
ing for the entire duration of the study.
The relatively small sizes of the Med¬
icaid practices for many physicians made
analysis at the physician level impos¬
sible. However, the distribution of use
of individual NSAIDs in our analyses
closely approximates the patterns ob¬
served in a representative national
sample of computerized pharmacies.31
There is no reason to believe that the
prescribing habits of our study cohort
differ significantly from the habits of
physicians who did not meet the require-
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Fig 2.—Changes in preference for selected catego¬
ries of analgesics among prescribers of zomepirac
sodium (n=260) and prescribers of nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs other than zomepirac(n=308) both following the release of zomepirac(top) and after it was withdrawn from the market(bottom). The drugs marked with an asterisk are
analgesic preparations containing propoxyphene
hydrochloride, another opioid, or a barbiturate.
ment for prescribing activity in Medic¬
aid, or that their prescribing habits
would vary for the larger, non-Medicaid
portion of their practices.
We were only able to obtain data on
analgesic prescribing for 4 months prior
to the release ofzomepirac, and 6 months
following its withdrawal from the mar¬
ket. Consequently, longer-term trends
in the prescribing of competing analge¬
sic products, independent ofchanges as¬
sociated with zomepirac's entry into and
withdrawal from the market, were dif¬
ficult to detect. However, because of the
rapid rise in the popularity of zomepirac
and its sudden withdrawal, short-term
changes in prescribing habits were
clearly discernible.
Other methodological problems arise
from the quasi-experimental nature of
the study design. Interrupted time-se¬
ries analysis, the strongest statistical
technique for analysis ofnonexperimen-
tal data, may not detect subtle changes
in trend, and cannot conclusively deter¬
mine the reasons for observed changes.
We compensated for this deficit by in-
eluding a comparison group of other-
NSAID prescribers. However, we had
no control over which primary care phy¬
sicians were classified as zomepirac pre¬
scribers or other-NSAID prescribers.
Our cohorts of zomepirac prescribers
and other-NSAID prescribers differed
slightly at baseline in rate of analgesic
use in their practices. Other-NSAID pre¬
scribers may also differ in other ways;
for example, they may be less likely to
try new analgesic products, or they may
see a different mix ofpatients and, there¬
fore, use different medications. How¬
ever, although differences between these
two groups are likely to exist, the over¬
all similarity ofpatterns ofanalgesic use
before zomepirac was first marketed,
the stability of prescribing throughout
the study period, and the visible dis¬
continuities in use of specific drugs fol¬
lowing the changes in the marketplace
give credibility to the measured substi¬
tution effects.
Could the observed changes in drug
use be explained by other changes in the
marketplace? Divergence of the utiliza¬
tion trends for zomepirac and other-
NSAID prescribers immediately follow¬
ing the market entry of zomepirac and
the sudden convergence of trends in cer¬
tain substitute categories following the
market withdrawal of zomepirac make
it very unlikely that unrecognized fac¬
tors were responsible for these substi¬
tution effects.
Because of the retrospective nature
of the study and limitations on available
data, it is impossible to assess certain
characteristics of the study physicians
that might influence their reactions to
product withdrawals. For example, we
know little about case-mix profile, spe¬
cific motivations for choosing zomepirac
vs alternative analgesic products, or the
influence of patient requests for par¬
ticular types of analgesic. To truly un¬
derstand the dynamics of prescribing
behavior, one would have to character¬
ize prospectively these and other clini¬
cal and nonclinical factors.34
Understanding Product Risks
and Benefits in Context
Some drugs have substantial risks that
are tolerated because oftheir established
benefits in relation to available thera¬
peutic alternatives (eg, zidovudine).
However, even less toxic drugs do not
always prove safe or effective for every
individual. From the epidemiologie
rather than the clinical perspective, pre¬
scribing following a regulatory change
or product withdrawal becomes rela¬
tively safer if the combined statistical
risk of all products prescribed within a
therapeutic category decreases.
Recent examples exist of the banning
or voluntary withdrawal of pharmaceu¬
tical products thought to be unsafe or
ineffective.4 Although limited, the best
available data suggest that the quality of
prescribing can either increase or de¬
crease following the removal of specific
medications from a national formulary35
or the withdrawal ofMedicaid reimburse¬
ment for scientifically unsubstantiated
therapies.4 One study reported no reduc¬
tion in risk of self-poisoning when dan¬
gerous products implicated in drug abuse
were removed from the national market,
primarily because of increased abuse of
drugs ofequal or greater toxicity.17 Thus,
suboptimal product substitution follow¬
ing well-intended regulatory initiatives
seems to be a generalized phenomenon
that policymakers must consider when¬
ever restrictions on drug availability are
proposed.
Risk trade-offs due to product sub¬
stitutions can occur not only when drugs
are banned or withdrawn, but when¬
ever prescriber choices are constrained,
whether by economic or administrative
limits. Even less drastic interventions,
such as audited triplicate prescription
forms for benzodiazepines, have been
associated with undesirable substitution
effects.36 Decision makers should care¬
fully consider the relative risks of com¬
peting products when determining phar¬
maceutical coverage policies in all set¬
tings that maintain formularies or
otherwise restrict access to specific
products, from major federal programs(eg, Medicare, Medicaid, and the De¬
partment of Veterans Affairs) to indi¬
vidual health organizations.
This study examined a product to
which significant, dramatic, and imme¬
diate health risks were ascribed. Ap¬
proximately 40 deaths were attributed
to anaphylactic reactions to zomepirac
in the Food and Drug Administration's
Sentinel Reporting System in the 28
months it was on the market37; a revised
Food and Drug Administration estimate
totaled 14 zomepirac-related deaths.10
Based on data from 1982 and early
1983,31·32 about 15 million prescriptions
for zomepirac were written while it was
on the market. Taken together, these
estimates indicate a total risk of 0.9 to
2.7 deaths per million zomepirac pre¬
scriptions. Thus, substitution of other
NSAIDs, which have a far lower risk of
anaphylaxis,15 for zomepirac may rep¬
resent safer prescribing.
However, propoxyphene and barbi¬
turate-containing analgesics, which we
have shown to be competing therapeu¬
tic substitutes for zomepirac, also carry
risks. For example, it has been estimated
that there are approximately 50 deaths
per million propoxyphene prescriptions,
about 40% ofwhich were attributable to
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overdose during our observation pe¬
riod.38-40 Propoxyphene and barbiturates
are also associated with other nonfatal
adverse outcomes, including habitua-
tion.21 However, these drugs' risks are
less dramatic than zomepirac's, are less
likely to be reported, and are therefore
less visibly attributable to the products
in question.We did not have access to morbidity
and mortality data necessary to conduct
a reliable population-based risk analy¬
sis. However, the key policy lesson to be
learned goes beyond the important is¬
sue of whether zomepirac's withdrawal
from the market was associated with an
increase or decrease in drug-related mor¬
tality. How could market withdrawal
have been better accomplished? Edu¬
cating prescribers about appropriate
pain management remains a long-term
strategy for decreasing analgesic risks,
but such education is time-consuming
and difficult to operationalize.1 Atamini-
mum, this study highlights a need for
more effective communication to medi¬
cal practitioners before or during prod¬
uct withdrawals or regulatory changes
to alert them to both the drug removal
and preferred therapeutic alternatives.4
Since mailed circulars appear to be in¬
effective means to accomplish these
tasks, other strategies need to be ex¬
plored, perhaps using credible opinion
leaders or local medical associations as
communication channels.
In summary, one cannot evaluate the
impact of withdrawing a given drug as¬
sociated with serious adverse drug re¬
actions except in relation to the risks
posed by substituted products. Although
policymakers may assume that with¬
drawing a drug eliminates its entire bur¬
den of risk, this is certainly not the case.
This study underscores the need for poli¬
cymakers to consider risk in context and
to anticipate unintended drug substitu¬
tions. Physicians respond actively, not
passively, to forced changes in their
range of therapeutic options. The de¬
gree of improvement in quality of care
through drug-restriction policies de¬
pends on the characteristics of available
therapeutic alternatives, the perceptions
ofprescribers and patients toward those
alternatives, and the degree to which
timely education and promotional efforts
can influence prescribing. At the very
least, a growing body of literature sug¬
gests thatprivate and public policymak¬
ers should identify likely effects of ra¬
tional and irrational product substitu¬
tion before banning specific agents in
order to characterize, and hopefully pre¬
vent, unintended outcomes.
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